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I. INTRODUCTION
A. Background
With the technological advancements in global communications, contractual arrangements
created by electronic transactions are clearly becoming more commonplace. Electronic contractual
arrangements have, however, raised complex legal issues unprecedented in the law. Courts must
now confront worldwide access to agreements via WebPages, e-mails, and CD-ROMs, and legal
doctrines must be consistently tested and reapplied to address new forms of contracting stimulated
by advancing technology.
Technology’s impact on traditional contract law doctrines is readily apparent in the
dilemmas generated by recent developments in computer software, hardware, and Internet
transactions.

In such transactions, sellers have increasingly begun utilizing “clickwrap”

agreements, whereby standard terms and conditions are displayed on the computer screen when the
user attempts to access the seller’s services. In a clickwrap agreement, the seller’s terms typically
pop up before a purchased software disc can be installed (“CD clickwrap”) or while a service is
being requested on the Internet.1 The term “clickwrap” evolved from the use of “shrinkwrap”
agreements, which are agreements wrapped in shrinkwrap cellophane within computer software
packaging, and that, by their terms, become effective following the expiration of a pre-defined

1

I.Lan Sys., Inc. v. Netscout Serv. Level Corp., 183 F. Supp. 2d 328, 337 (D. Mass. 2002); Mortgage Plus, Inc. v.
DocMagic, Inc., No. 03-2582-GTV-DJW, 2004 WL 2331918, at *4 (D. Kan. Aug. 23, 2004); Dawn Davidson, Click
and Commit: What Terms are Users Bound to When They Enter Websites?, 26 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1171, 1181-82;
(2000); Kaustuv M. Das, Comment, Forum Selection Clauses in Consumer Clickwrap and Browsewrap Agreements
and the “Reasonably Communicated” Test, 77 WASH. L. REV. 481, 497 (2002).
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return period for the software (typically 30 days).2 Because of such evolution, as well as the many
similarities between shrinkwrap and clickwrap, courts addressing the enforceability of clickwrap
have relied upon the case law surrounding shrinkwrap cases in formulating their decisions.3
Accordingly, any writing discussing the particulars of clickwrap will be peppered with an
occasional shrinkwrap case, and this note proves no different.
B. Focus and Objective
The enforceability of clickwrap terms, which are often not known to the user until after
payment, has become a subject of much debate in the courts.4 Because many of the clickwrap cases
have been fact-based decisions with seemingly contradictory conclusions, various scholarly and
academic writings have pointed out the need for a heightened degree of clarity and certainty
concerning the enforceability of clickwrap agreements.5 Some scholars contend, for instance, that
even the federal appellate circuits6 are split on whether clickwrap agreements are enforceable.7
The aim of this note is to provide clarity to the clickwrap debate and to argue that the legal
reasoning behind the various clickwrap decisions has, in fact, been relatively consistent. More
importantly, this note illustrates that clickwrap agreements are a legitimate form of contracting, and
that objections to clickwrap are substantially no different than objections to most other forms of
contracts.
2

Mortgage Plus, Inc., 2004 WL 2331918, at *4; Davidson, supra note 1, at 1180-82.
Ryan J. Casamiquela, Contractual Assent and Enforceability in Cyberspace, 17 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 475, 476 (2002).
4
Kevin W. Grierson, Annotation, Enforceability of “Clickwrap” or Shrinkwrap” Agreements Common in Computer
Software, Hardware, and Internet Transactions, 106 A.L.R.5th 309 (2003-2004); James C. Hoye, Note, Click-Do We
Have a Deal?, 6 SUFFOLK J. TRIAL & APP. ADVOC. 163, 165 (2001).
5
William J. Condon, Jr., Comment, Electronic Assent to Online Contracts: Do Courts Consistently Enforce Clickwrap
Agreements?, 16 REG. U. L. REV. 433, 434 (2003-2004); Ann Bartow, Electrifying Copyright Norms and Making
Cyberspace More Like a Book, 48 VILL. L. REV. 13, 113 (2003); Das, supra note 1, at 504-05; Hoye, supra note 4, at
165.
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There are currently no Supreme Court decisions related to the enforceability of clickwrap. Condon, supra note 5, at
446.
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Ron Corbett, IP Strategies for Start-Up Ecommerce Companies in the Post-Dot-Bomb Era, 8 TEX. WESLEYAN L. REV.
643, 661-62 & n.136 (2002); Bartow, supra note 5, at 113 & n.343 (2003).
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In analyzing clickwrap cases, one can easily become entangled in various disputes such as
the prevailing UCC provisions or whether the UCC applies at all. This note endeavors to slice
through such entanglements to four critical issues that lie at the heart of the clickwrap debate: (i) the
requirement for notice of contractual terms; (ii) the necessary opportunity to review and reject the
terms; (iii) the impact of adhesion doctrines on standardized contracts; and (iv) the effect of prior
written agreements on clickwrap.

The first two issues, “notice of terms” and “review and

rejection”, are, of course, necessary ingredients in establishing a manifestation of contractual
assent.8 Accordingly, part II and part III of this note are dedicated to questions of whether a
meeting of the minds can be formulated in a purely electronic agreement. Specifically, Part II of
this note will briefly discuss the general legality of electronic transactions and the reason that buyer
assent to clickwrap remains an issue. Part III provides an in-depth discussion of mutual assent in
clickwrap, specifically the above-mentioned requirements of notice and the requisite ability to
review and reject. In exploring the issues of notice and the ability to reject, this section will
necessarily consider the impact of such factors on both on-line as well as CD clickwrap. Next, Part
IV will assess the contract of adhesion questions that are inherent in clickwrap agreements, and Part
V will follow with a discussion concerning the impact on clickwrap of prior written agreements.
II. THE VALIDITY OF ELECTRONIC TRANSACTIONS AND THE REMAINING
QUESTION OF ASSENT IN CLICKWRAP
A. UETA and the Enforceability of Electronic Documents.
The enforceability of a written provision in downloadable electronic form, and specifically of
electronic signatures, has been clearly settled by the passage and adoption of the Uniform Electronic
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Register.com, Inc. v. Verio, Inc., 365 F.3d 393, 430-31 (2d Cir. 2004).
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Transaction Act (“UETA”)9 and the Electronic Signatures in Global and National Commerce Act
(“E-Sign Act”).10 The E-Sign Act provides that a signature, contract, or other record relating to such
transaction may not be denied legal effect, validity, or enforceability solely because it is in electronic
form.11 The UETA, which is of similar purpose as the E-Sign Act, was passed by the National
Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws in July, 1999,12 and as been adopted by all but
four of the states.13 The UETA reiterates the E-Sign Act by stating a “contract may not be denied
legal effect or enforceability solely because an electronic record was used in its formation.”14

It is

of some importance to note that the E-Sign Act preempts state law only in those states that have not
enacted sections 1-16 of the UETA.15
Neither the E-Sign Act nor the UETA is intended to displace existing contract law
doctrines.16

Consequently, both acts leave the determination as to whether mutual assent has

occurred in an electronic transaction to general contract law.17 Notably, the official comment to the
UETA cites section 3 of the Restatement (second) of Contracts that an agreement cannot be
established without a manifestation of mutual assent, and that a determination of such assent is to be
made in the context of the specific circumstances.18

9

Valerie Watnick, The Electronic Formation of Contracts and the Common Law “Mailbox Rule”, 56 BAYLOR L. REV.
175, 190 (2004); see generally UNIF. ELEC. TRANSACTIONS ACT (U.E.T.A.) (1999), available at
http://www.nccusl.org/Update/ActSearchResults.aspx (last visited April 30, 2006).
10
Pub. L. No. 106-229, 114 Stat. 464 (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 7001 et seq. (2000)); Specht v. Netscape Commc’ns
Corp., 306 F.3d 17, 27 n.11 (2d Cir. 2002).
11
Elec. Signatures in Global & Nat’l Commerce Act § 7001(a). Specht, 306 F.3d at 27 n.11.
12
See generally UNIF. ELEC. TRANSACTIONS ACT (U.E.T.A.) (1999), available at
http://www.nccusl.org/Update/ActSearchResults.aspx (last visited April 28, 2006); Watnick, supra note 9, at 190.
13
Only Alaska, Georgia, New York, and Washington have not enacted the UETA. Global E-Commerce Law, UETA
State by State Comparison Table, available at http://www.bakernet.com/ecommerce/uetacomp.htm (stating that
information was last updated June 2, 2004) (last visited April 28, 2006); see also Tex. Bus. & Com. Code § 43.001 et
seq.
14
U.E.T.A. at prefatory note, available at http://www.nccusl.org/Update/ (last visited April 30, 2006); Watnick, supra
note 9, at 190.
15
Watnick, supra note 9, at 191.
16
Id.
17
Id. at 190-92.
18
Id. at 190; U.E.T.A. § 2 cmt. 1, available at http://www.nccusl.org/Update/ (last visited April 30, 2005).
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B. The Impersonal Nature of Clickwrap: a “Meeting of the Minds” in the Absence of
Communication
It is with regard to the doctrine of assent that the debate on the enforceability of clickwrap
has predominately occurred. The mutuality of assent, or a meeting of the minds, is essential to the
formation of an enforceable contract.19 Whether it is executed electronically or via a physical
document, a transaction, in order to be a contract, requires a manifestation of agreement between
the parties.20 The impersonal nature of clickwrap agreements, however, raises substantive questions
with regard to contractual assent. In a clickwrap agreement, the same terms are presented to all
users, and the parties do not meet face-to-face or personally communicate.21 Considering such an
impersonal method of contracting, can there be assurances that a meeting of the minds has actually
occurred?22 To phrase the question more precisely, do clickwrap agreements represent a meeting of
the minds under traditional contract law?
III. MUTUAL ASSENT IN CLICKWRAP: THE REQUIREMENT OF NOTICE AND THE
RIGHT TO REVIEW AND REJECT
A. The Validity of On-Line Clickwrap: Determining Conspicuous Notice and the Ability to Reject
1. The Requirement for Constructive Notice in On-Line Clickwrap
The seminal case regarding assent in web-based contracts is Specht v. Netscape
Communications Corp.23

In Specht, defendant Netscape Communications Corp. (“Netscape”)

invited users to download free copies of its software program, SmartDownload, which it had made
available on its website. By clicking on an icon that indicated their desire to obtain SmartDownload,
19

Hatch v. Standard Oil Co., 100 U.S. 124, 133 (1879); Utley v. Donaldson, 94 U.S. 29, 47 (1876); RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 19(2) (1981).
20
Specht v. Netscape Commc’ns Corp., 306 F.3d 17, 29, 31 (2d Cir. 2002); Forrest v. Verizon Commc’ns, Inc.. 805
A.2d 1007, 1011 (D.C. 2002).
21
Wei Wei Jeang & Ronin A. Brooks, Current On-Line Issues, 8 TEX. WESLEYAN L. REV. 615, 623 (2002).
22
Casamiquela, supra note 3, at 492.
23
306 F.3d at 17; Casamiquela, supra note 3, at 481-82.
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users were able to download Netscape’s software onto their hard drives. Netscape argued that by
accessing SmartDownload, such users had consented to the license terms that Netscape had
identified on its website. Netscape did not, however, require users to click an “I agree” icon (or a
similar form of physical acceptance) prior to accessing SmartDownload. On the contrary, the only
reference to Netscape’s license agreement appeared in the text of a link well below the software
download symbol. Such text urged users to “please review and agree to the terms of the Netscape
SmartDownload software license agreement.”24 The text of this link was visible to users only when
they scrolled down to the bottom of the SmartDownload webpage. The central issue, according to
the court, was whether the user plaintiffs had constructive notice of the terms of Netscape’s
agreement.25
In light of the features of Netscape’s website and the location of its terms, the Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit held that Netscape had not provided sufficient notice of its terms to
demonstrate a user’s manifestation of assent to Netscape’s agreement.26 In formulating its holding
and analyzing the enforceability of on-line contracts, the court established a two-tier requirement of
“reasonably conspicuous notice” and “unambiguous manifestation of assent”.27

The court

maintained that “reasonably conspicuous notice of the existence of contract terms and unambiguous
manifestation of assent to those terms . . . are essential if electronic bargaining is to have integrity
and credibility.”28 Without such reasonably conspicuous terms, the court declared that electronic
contracts cannot be analogized to the paper world of arms-length bargaining.29 The principles of
constructive notice apply “equally to the emergent world of online product delivery, pop-up screens,

24

Specht, 306 F.3d at 23.
Id., at 27, 31-32.
26
Id. at 35.
27
Id.
28
Id.
29
Id. at 31-32.
25
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hyperlinked pages, clickwrap licensing, scrollable documents, and urgent admonitions to ‘Download
Now!’"30
The court did acknowledge Netscape’s argument that the position of the computer scroll
bar could have indicated to users that further information remained below the SmartDownload
icon.31 The court held, however, that simply because a user may have known additional information
existed below the icon did not mean that the user should have reasonably concluded that a license
agreement appeared in such location.32 The court pointed out that there was no reason to assume
users would scroll down or through computer screens just because they were there.33 A reference to
the existence of terms on a related or associated screen is not, according to the court, sufficient to
place a user on constructive notice of such terms.34 The Second Circuit concluded that clicking on
Netscape’s SmartDownload button could not communicate a user’s assent to Netscape’s agreement
when the user was not provided conspicuous notice of the terms of such agreement.35
2. Requiring the Buyer to Click “I Agree”: Distinguishing Clickwrap from Browsewrap
In establishing its two-tier test, the Second Circuit’s holding in Specht36 effectively
differentiated between an enforceable clickwrap agreement and what has become commonly known
as browsewrap.37

Clickwrap is now defined by the courts as an electronic agreement that

automatically presents contractual terms to a user and requires such user to affirmatively click an “I
agree” icon prior to the agreement taking effect.38 Browsewrap, conversely, refers to a contractual

30

Id. at 30.
Id. at 31-32.
32
Id.
33
Id. at 31.
34
Id. at 32.
35
Id. at 29-30.
36
Id.at 35.
37
Casamiquela, supra note 3, at 475-76, 482-83.
38
Specht, 306 F.3d at 22; Casamiquela, supra note 3, at 476.
31
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situation similar to that found in Specht,39 whereby a vendor places its terms somewhere on its
website without automatically requiring users to accept such terms.40 From a marketing perspective,
it is not difficult to understand why vendors would want to avoid forcing a user to sort through a
legal document prior to purchasing their product or service.41 In establishing legal enforceability,
however, a seller’s use of a browsewrap agreement carries a substantial risk. In the Second Circuit’s
decision in Specht, for instance, the court specifically expounded on the fact that no true clickwrap
agreement accompanied the SmartDownload software.42 Instead of a clickwrap agreement that
conspicuously presented its terms and required users to affirmatively click their assent, the court
noted that Netscape’s users were required to browse through the company’s website in order to
access the accompanying agreement.43

By utilizing a browsewrap format for its agreement,

Netscape failed to give sufficient notice of the terms of its agreement, and as a result, Netscape’s
contract was found to be unenforceable.44
3. Deep Linking into Websites: The Ability to Bypass Terms Vacates a Finding of Assent
The requirement of notice of terms is especially apparent in cases involving “deep linking”
into websites.45 Deep linking, which involves bypassing a vendor’s home page and linking directly
into the interior of its website, was the primary issue of concern in Ticketmaster Corp. v.
Tickets.com.46 In Ticketmaster Corp., the website of plaintiff Ticketmaster Corp. (“Ticketmaster”)
provided its customers with the ability to purchase tickets to its events.

39

The home page of

Specht, 306 F.3d at 23.
Casamiquela, supra note 3, at 476.
41
David L. Hitchcock & Kathy E. Needleman, Current Status of Copyright Protection in the Digital Age and Related
Topics, 8 TEX. WESLEYAN L. REV. 539, 588 (2002).
42
Specht, 306 F.3d at 23, 25.
43
Id. at 22-23.
44
Id. at 35.
45
Ticketmaster Corp. v. Tickets.com, 2000 WL 525390, at *1-3 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 27, 2000), aff'd, 2 Fed. Appx. 741 (9th
Cir. 2001).
46
Id. at *1.
40
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Ticketmaster’s website also contained a user agreement stipulating the terms and conditions for use
of its website.
Defendant Tickets.com also performed consumer ticket services but in a somewhat different
manner.

Tickets.com supplied an informational service regarding available tickets to specific

events, and a link was given to customers to access the websites of the related ticket providers. With
regard to accessing Ticketmaster’s services, the link provided by Tickets.com transferred the
customer directly to the interior of the Ticketmaster website, thereby bypassing Ticketmaster’s home
page and its accompanying agreement. Ticketmaster brought breach of contract claims against
Tickets.com on the basis of the terms and conditions on Ticketmaster’s home page. The pertinent
terms of the agreement provided that any entity going beyond the home page agreed to the terms and
conditions therein, including provisions that the information was for personal use only, was not to be
used for commercial purposes, and that no deep linking was allowed. The court rejected
Ticketmaster’s claim and specifically contrasted Ticketmaster’s website agreement with that of a
typical clickwrap agreement.47 The court pointed out that although many websites require the user
to click on an icon agreeing to specific terms and conditions, Ticketmaster’s site did not.48 Further,
the court stated that the terms were set forth in a manner that required the customer to scroll through
the home page just to find and read them.49 More importantly, if a user bypassed the home page,
Ticketmaster’s terms never appeared, and the court asserted that no individual can reasonably be
expected to agree to unknown terms.50 The court concluded, not surprisingly, that Ticketmaster
failed to give conspicuous notice of the terms of the agreement, and without such notice, an

47

Id. at 3.
Id.
49
Id.
50
Id.
48
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unambiguous manifestation of assent to such terms could not occur.51 Much like Netscape in
Specht, Ticketmaster could not verify assent to its agreement because it could not verify that its users
had knowledge, constructive or otherwise, of the agreement’s terms.52
4. The Necessary Opportunity to Reject: Invalidating “Assent Now-Terms Later” Contracts
Inherent in the ability to give unambiguous and affirmative assent is also the ability to reject.
In Register.com, Inc. v. Verio, Inc., the lack of ability to reject an agreement served to invalidate the
plaintiff’s on-line contract.53 The plaintiff, Register.com, provided services through its website to
search for entities that had registered internet domain names. Subsequent to each search result,
Register.com’s terms of use were automatically provided to the user. The Second Circuit ruled that
such “assent now-terms later” contracts were not enforceable because it eliminated the user’s
necessary ability to reject the agreement.54 “A party cannot,” the court declared, “manifest assent to
the terms and conditions of a contract prior to having an opportunity to review them; a party must
be given some opportunity to reject or assent.”55 The court noted that Register.com did not utilize a
standard clickwrap agreement whereby access to its services would be withheld until a party
affirmatively assented to its terms.56 On the contrary, by the time Register.com had presented its
terms of agreement, it had already provided its services.57 Under such an agreement, the court
stated that the user would have no opportunity to reject Register.com’s terms, and “would be bound
to comply with them irrespective of actual assent.”58 Importantly, the court held that even multiple
search submissions on Register.com’s website would not necessarily equate with assent to its

51

Id.
Id.
53
365 F.3d 393, 430-31 (2d Cir. 2004).
54
Id.
55
Id. at 430.
56
Id. at 429.
57
Id. at 431.
58
Id. at 431.
52
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terms.59 Although repeated exposure would have put the users on notice that Register.com’s terms
existed, it is also arguable that each time a user utilized Register.com’s services, the user could
reject such terms and never manifest assent.60 While Register.com’s automatic presentation of
terms obviously met the first requirement in Specht61 of conspicuous notice, its on-line contract
clearly failed the second test of unambiguous manifestation of assent.62
5. Confirming the Validity of On-Line Clickwrap
When an on-line agreement meets the two-part test of “conspicuous notice” and “explicit
assent” (to include the ability to reject), the courts have accordingly held such agreements to be
valid and enforceable.63 By automatically presenting its terms and conditions, an on-line clickwrap
agreement64 undoubtedly provides the user with conspicuous notice of its terms. Additionally, a
manifestation of assent is unambiguous when the user is required to click a link verifying agreement
following the presentation of such terms. Also, importantly, the user is provided a full opportunity
to review and reject such terms prior to receiving the accompanying product or service.
In Caspi v. Microsoft Network, L.L.C, for instance, the Superior Court of New Jersey upheld
Microsoft’s on-line subscriber agreement that required a user to click “I agree” to an obligatory
number of terms prior to accessing services.65 The court ruled that such users were “given ample

59

Id.
Id.
61
Specht v. Netscape Commc’ns Corp., 306 F.3d 17, 35 (2d Cir. 2002).
62
Register.com, Inc., 365 F.3d at 431; Specht, 306 F.3d at 35.
63
Condon, supra note 5, at 454-56; Casamiquela, supra note 3, at 486-87.
64
The phrase “on-line clickwrap agreement” should be differentiated from the previously described browsewrap
agreements, “assent now-terms-later” contracts, and/or “clickwrap” agreements that permitted deep-linking . A true onclickwrap agreement automatically presents the terms of the contract, cannot be bypassed by “deep-linking” into the
seller’s website, and forces the user to click an acceptance icon prior to receiving services. Specht, 306 F.3d at 23, 25,
30, 35; Ticketmaster Corp., 2000 WL 525390 at *3; Register.com, Inc., 365 F.3d at 429-30.
65
732 A.2d 528, 530-31 (N.J. Super Ct. App. Div. 1999).
60
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opportunity to affirmatively assent to the [agreement] . . . and retained the option of rejecting the
contract with impunity.”66
Similarly, in Forrest v. Verizon Communications, Inc., the District of Columbia Court of
Appeals concluded that by clicking an “accept” button after scrolling through the mandatory terms
of Verizon’s internet subscriber agreement, the subscriber had sufficiently demonstrated assent to
Verizon’s agreement.67 In establishing its opinion, the court stated decisively that “a contract is no
less a contract simply because it is done on a computer.”68
The necessary opportunity to review and reject was also specifically addressed in Moore v.
Microsoft Corp., when a New York appellate court ruled that Microsoft’s clickwrap agreement was
a binding contract.69 In dismissing the plaintiff’s claims against Microsoft, the court noted that the
plaintiff was provided the opportunity to read and reject Microsoft’s contract at leisure.70 By
clicking on the “I agree” icon after such an opportunity, the plaintiff clearly manifested its assent to
Microsoft’s agreement.71
The courts in on-line clickwrap cases have, therefore, established two critical factors in
determining the enforceability of Internet contracts. First, there must be conspicuous notice of the
agreement’s terms, and such terms must be presented prior to the user accessing the related product
or service. Second, a user’s manifestation of assent must be unambiguous, and such unambiguous
assent cannot be confirmed without the prior ability to review and reject the terms of the agreement.
If, however, an affirmative response to both these tests is required to validate on-line agreements,
how then can CD clickwrap agreements, which are generally not reviewed by the buyer until after

66

Id. at 531.
805 A.2d 1007, 1010-11 (D.C. 2002).
68
Id. at 1011.
69
741 N.Y.S.2d 91, 92 (N.Y. App. Div. 2002).
70
Id.
71
Id.
67
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purchase, be considered a legitimate form of contracting? If the ability to review and reject prior to
accessing services is a requirement of an enforceable electronic agreement, is it still possible that
CD clickwrap could also be held enforceable? The answer is yes, and the legal reasoning behind
such holding is the subject of the next section.
B. The Enforceability of CD Clickwrap: Notice on the Outside, Terms on the Inside,
and a Right to Return
1. Required Notice of Subsequent Terms and an Ability to Reject by Return
Much like the case law involving on-line agreements, the requirement for notice of terms
prior to purchase becomes essential in establishing the enforceability of CD clickwrap. In CD
clickwrap cases, however, the mandatory notice requirement converts to an obligation for notice
that additional terms will be incorporated after purchase.72 Similarly, the ability to read and reject
becomes the ability to return.73 The rationale behind these doctrines is found in the Seventh Circuit
Court of Appeal’s decision in ProCD, Inc. v Zeidenberg,74 the seminal case on CD Clickwrap.75
In ProCD, Inc.,76 the defendant, Matthew Zeidenberg, purchased a CD-Rom directory
database from the plaintiff, ProCD, Inc. (“ProCD”), and subsequently began utilizing the database
for commercial purposes. ProCD filed suit against Zeidenberg alleging that Zeidenberg’s
commercial use of its product violated the associated software license agreement. ProCD’s license
accompanied the software both in the form of shrinkwrap as well as a typical clickwrap agreement
that splashed across Zeidenberg’s computer screen each time the software was used.77

72

The

Hill v. Gateway 2000, Inc., 105 F.3d 1147, 1150 (7th Cir. 1997); ProCD, Inc. v Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447, 1450-53
(7 Cir. 1996).
73
Hill, 105 F.3d at 1150; ProCD, Inc., 86 F.3d at 1450-53.
74
ProCD, Inc., 86 F.3d at 1449-53.
75
I. Lan Sys., Inc. v. Netscout Serv. Level Corp., 183 F.Supp.2d 328, 337 (D. Mass. 2002); Condon, supra note 5, at
438; Jeang & Brooks, supra note 20, at 623.
76
ProCD, Inc. 86 F.3d at 1447.
77
Although ProCD, Inc. contained the elements of both clickwrap and shrinkwrap, many cases and scholars still refer to
ProCD, Inc. as a shrinkwrap case. E.g., I. Lan Sys., Inc., 183 F.Supp.2d at 337; Casamiquela, supra note 3, at 478.
th
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clickwrap agreement barred a user of ProCD’s software from accessing the database services unless
such user provided an affirmative assent to the software terms. Additionally, the outside of each
box containing the software declared that the product would be subject to the license agreement
contained within.
In asserting his case, Zeidenberg argued that a contract was formed with ProCD when he
purchased the software, and therefore ProCD’s clickwrap agreement constituted additional terms to
the contract that he had not accepted. The Seventh Circuit concurred that a contract includes only
those terms that the parties have affirmatively agreed to, and that a party cannot assent to hidden
terms.78 The court held, however, that one of the terms to which Zeidenberg agreed to when he
purchased the software was the inclusion of ProCD’s license agreement.79
In substantiating its holding, the court highlighted a number of example transactions
whereby the exchange of money precedes the communication of detailed terms, such as airline
transportation, insurance contracts, and tickets to a concert or theatre.80 Simply because it was an
electronic transaction, the court proclaimed, did not necessarily invalidate a “money now-terms
later” agreement.81 The Seventh Circuit pointed out that a vendor cannot reasonably be expected to
print its entire license agreement on the outside of its packages, and to do so would eliminate other
information that buyers would presumably find more useful.82 The solution, according to the court,
is for vendors to provide notice that additional terms will accompany the product and to provide a
reasonable time period to return the accompanying product if such terms are deemed undesirable.83
“Notice on the outside, terms on the inside, and a right to return the software for a refund if the

78

ProCD, Inc., 86 F.3d at 1450.
Id.
80
Id. at 1451.
81
Id.
82
Id.
83
Id. at 1450-51.
79
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terms are unacceptable,” the court declared, “may be a means of doing business valuable to buyers
and sellers alike.”84

Accordingly, the court maintained that ProCD specifically extended to

Zeidenberg such opportunity to reject. “Zeidenberg inspected the package, tried out the software,
learned of the license, and did not reject the goods.”85 The court concluded, therefore, that CD
clickwrap (and shrinkwrap) agreements such as those utilized by ProCD are “enforceable unless
their terms are objectionable on grounds applicable to contracts in general.”86
One year later, the Seventh Circuit reaffirmed its decision in ProCD, Inc. when it was faced
with a shrinkwrap case in Hill v. Gateway 2000, Inc.87 In Hill, a consumer ordered a computer by
phone from Gateway 2000, Inc. (“Gateway”).

When the computer arrived, it contained a

shrinkwrap license agreement that governed the terms of purchase unless the computer was returned
within thirty days. Although no details of terms were discussed when the consumer placed his
phone order, the court pointed out that the consumer knew from Gateway’s advertisements that
additional contractual terms would accompany the purchase.88 The court held that given notice of
terms, and a chance to inspect both the item and the terms, the consumer had affirmatively assented
to Gateway’s license agreement when he kept the computer for more than the specified thirty-day
return period.89 In confirming the ProCD, Inc. doctrine of “notice on the outside, terms on the
inside, and a right to review and reject,” the Seventh Circuit in Hill established what has become
known as the “layered contract” approach, whereby the timing of the contract’s execution is
somewhat indefinite.90

84

Id.
Id. at 1453.
86
Id. at 1449.
87
Hill v. Gateway 2000, Inc., 105 F.3d 1147, 1150 (7th Cir. 1997).
88
Id. at 1150.
89
Id.
90
M.A. Mortenson Co., Inc. v. Timberline Software Corp., 998 P.2d 305, 313 (Wash. 2000).
85
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Nevertheless, in two additional cases involving money now-terms later agreements, the
courts invalidated the vendor’s shrinkwrap agreements. Interestingly, the first case was extremely
similar to Hill and also involved Gateway.
2. Unambiguous Assent: Establishing Proper Notice of Subsequent Terms
In Klocek v. Gateway, Inc., the U.S. District Court of Kansas found Gateway’s shrinkwrap
agreement to be unenforceable because Gateway failed to provide adequate notice that additional
terms would be incorporated into the purchase.91 As in Hill, Gateway supplied the consumer with a
computer that contained a shrinkwrap agreement stipulating that additional terms and conditions
would be automatically incorporated into the purchase following the expiration of a five-day review
and return period.
The court held the dispute to be governed by section 2-207 of the UCC,92 which provides
that any additional terms proposed that are different from those offered and agreed upon constitute
either an expression of acceptance or merely a written confirmation of agreement.93 By basing its
decision on section 2-207, the court specifically rejected the reasoning established by the Seventh
Circuit94 in ProCD, Inc. and Hill.95 The Court declared that in both ProCD, Inc. and Hill, “the
Seventh Circuit concluded without support that section 2-207 was irrelevant,” and that such
conclusion was in direct contradiction to the official comment to section 2-207.96 The court
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explicitly stated that it was “not persuaded [to] follow the Seventh Circuit’s reasoning.”97
Somewhat ironically, however, the Klocek court did just that, and based its ultimate decision on the
“notice of subsequent terms” theory established in ProCD, Inc.98
In holding Gateway’s agreement to be unenforceable, the court stated that there was “no
evidence that [Gateway] informed the [consumer] of the review and return period as a condition of
the sales transaction, or that the parties contemplated additional terms to the agreement.”99 The
court acknowledged that under section 2-207 of the UCC, it was possible to argue that Gateway’s
shrinkwrap agreement was a conditional expression of acceptance constituting a counter-offer.100
To constitute a valid counter-offer, however, the court held that Gateway was required to expressly
make its acceptance conditional on the consumer's assent to the additional or different terms.101 The
court found that Gateway provided no indication that it was unwilling to proceed without the
consumer’s agreement to its shrinkwrap.102 The court stated that “it is not unreasonable for a
vendor to clearly communicate to a buyer at the time of sale . . . the fact that the vendor will
propose additional terms as a condition of sale.”103 A seller, the court declared, must communicate
to a purchaser an unwillingness to proceed in the absence of a buyer’s agreement to additional
terms.104 In the absence of such notice, the mere fact that the consumer kept the product longer than
Gateway’s stipulated review and return period was not sufficient to establish unambiguous assent to
Gateway’s terms.105
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3. The Insufficiency of Notice without the Ability to Reject and Return
Regardless of how conspicuously a seller displays the terms of its CD clickwrap (or
shrinkwrap) agreement, the contract will not be held enforceable if the buyer was given no
opportunity to reject the terms of the agreement and return the product.106

The court’s reasoning in

the following case, Arizona Retail Systems, Inc. v. Software Link, Inc., emphatically illustrates this
point.107
In Arizona Retail Systems, Inc., the court both upheld and dismissed two types of shrinkwrap
agreements that were coupled with identical software and purchased by the same buyer from the
same company.108 The seller in this case, Arizona Retail Systems, Inc., had shipped the buyer its
software containing a shrinkwrap license agreement, but had done so without a notice that
additional terms would be incorporated into the software purchase. On the initial purchase, the
seller shipped both a test version of the software as well as a live, functional, version. The language
printed on the software package stated that by opening the software, the user would be bound by all
terms of the license incorporated inside. Nevertheless, the court upheld the shrinkwrap agreement
in the initial purchase because the test software module enabled the user to accept or reject the live
version prior to installing it.109 When the same user made subsequent purchases of the software,
however, the product did not include any such module that provided the user an opportunity to
refuse or consent to the license. The court held the subsequent shrinkwrap license to be invalid
because it failed to provide the purchaser of the software an opportunity to review and reject the
software and the terms of purchase.110 The court asserted that the shrinkwrap constituted proposed
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modifications to the contract by the seller, and under Section 2-209 of the UCC, assent to such
proposed contractual modifications must be express.111
The second software purchase in Arizona Retail Systems, Inc. points out the insufficiency of
mere notice of terms.112 The buyer in this case knew, from the first purchase, that terms would be
forthcoming on the second shipment. By stipulating that the terms became effective upon opening
the software, however, the seller eliminated the buyer’s opportunity to review and reject the license
agreement.113 As numerous courts have found, CD clickwrap agreements (and shrinkwrap) can
bind a consumer only when that consumer is given both prior notice that additional terms will be
incorporated into the agreement, and a right to read and reject such terms if they are deemed
unacceptable.114 Such right to “read and reject” is imperative to sufficiently show mutual assent.115
Provided that notice is given, therefore, clicking on an “I agree” icon will be considered explicit
assent if the user is afforded (i) a chance to inspect both the items and the terms; and (ii) an
opportunity to reject such terms by returning the product for a full refund.116
4. Reconciling Disparity in CD Clickwrap
Regardless of whether clickwrap (or shrinkwrap) agreements are reviewed as part of a
“layered contract” or as proposed modifications or counter-offers under the UCC, the key element is
explicit assent, and explicit assent cannot be established without the ability to reject. Although the
court decisions discussed above may be conflicting in their final holdings, the differences in legal
reasoning between the courts may not be as wide as it would first appear. In the final analysis, these
111
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cases actually are in agreement that a prior contract of some kind was, in fact, formed. In upholding
the validity of clickwrap agreements, for example, the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit held
that when the buyer purchased the software, one of the terms such buyer agreed to was that the
purchase contract was subject to the additional terms of the seller’s license agreement.117 The court
continued by declaring that a buyer cannot agree to hidden terms.118 It can be argued that the
Seventh Circuit’s decision viewed the original purchase contract as one in which the buyer agreed
to the review and possible inclusion of the seller’s additional terms.

The court in Klocek,

conversely, found no presence of any agreement that incorporated provisions for review and
possible inclusion of additional terms.119

Consequently, the Klocek court held the associated

clickwrap agreement to be unenforceable.120

Most interesting, however, was the decision in

Arizona Retail Systems, Inc. in which the court found one software license to contain the ability to
reject while another license for the same software did not.121 The court therefore invalidated one
contract while enforcing the other.122
5. Clarifying Notice of Subsequent Terms and the Proper Period of Review
The primary variables, it appears, are not the relevant UCC articles or whether a “layered
contract” exists, but rather, the methodology utilized by the seller in communicating its wish to
incorporate subsequent terms and the time period given to the consumer to review the terms. Given
these variables, two key issues arise: (a) the required clarity of notice in communicating such terms;
and (b) the length of time a buyer must reasonably be given to review the terms.
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(a) Clarity of Notice
In discussing the issue of notice, the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit held ProCD’s
clickwrap agreement to be enforceable, in part, because it specifically communicated the
subsequent inclusion of the seller’s full license agreement.123 One year later, however, in Hill, the
Seventh Circuit required only a notice that some additional terms would be included.124
Alternatively, in the Kansas federal district, the court declared that a vendor must clearly
communicate the inclusion of its standard terms.125 Similarly, in Arizona Retail Systems, Inc., the
court proclaimed that a seller must communicate to the buyer the subsequent inclusion of any terms
it deems essential.126 Although the Seventh Circuit in Hill was somewhat lenient in the notice
methodology required, counsel should be forewarned that most clickwrap cases have compelled the
seller to clearly and conspicuously communicate its intent to include subsequent terms.127
(b) Determining a Reasonable Length of Review
Much like what constitutes conspicuous notice, the required period of review also seems
somewhat unclear. Granted, courts have made it evident that the period for the review of terms
must be reasonable.128 For instance, in rejecting the seller’s shrinkwrap agreement, the court in
Klocek noted a critical difference between the thirty-day return period in the Seventh Circuit’s
decision in Hill and the five-day return period involved in its case.129 Nevertheless, neither the Hill
decision nor other judgments have established a minimum requisite time period for a user’s review
123
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of enforceable clickwrap terms.130

Considering the current state of clickwrap case law, it is

doubtful such a review period will be defined by the courts at any time in the near future. As the
court in Caspi v. The Microsoft Network L.L.C. pointed out, reasonable notice, to include an
adequate period to reject, is a question of law for the court to decide.131 Nevertheless, in reviewing
CD clickwrap (and shrinkwrap) agreements that courts have deemed enforceable, it seems safe to
assume that courts would consider a thirty-day review period to be reasonable.132
6. The Ability to Reject and Freedom to Contract
The “ability to reject” requirement, as it relates to clickwrap, results in an additional
intriguing issue related to the standardized format and lack of negotiation in clickwrap.

A

contractual process, after all, has its greatest appeal when two parties are allowed to freely negotiate
their associated benefits from the bargain.133 Such bargaining theoretically leads to a mutual assent
and a meeting of the minds.134 Clickwrap agreements, however, do not necessarily represent a
meeting of the minds traditionally present in conventional contracts.135 A clickwrap agreement only
provides the user with the ability to accept or reject the contract; negotiation, in the traditional
sense, is generally not possible.

The question that arises, then, is what impact occurs on a

clickwrap agreement when one party feels it has no choice but to accept the agreement? Such
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contracts are typically referred to as contracts of adhesion,136 and the nature of clickwrap
agreements makes them inherently associated with such a title.137
IV. CLICKWRAP AS A CONTRACT OF ADHESION: THE BENEFIT OF A
STANDARDIZED CONTRACT V. UNCONSCIONABLE TERMS
A. Defining Clickwrap as an Adhesion Contract: Standardized Terms, No Negotiation, and
Unequal Bargaining Power
A contract of adhesion is generally defined as a standardized contract, imposed by a party of
superior bargaining strength, that provides the other party only the ability to reject or accept it.138
Obviously, clickwrap agreements, by definition, fall into such a category. Clickwrap agreements
are, after all, typically standardized contracts that are executed with no negotiation between the
parties.139

As should be expected, however, it would be a mistake to assume that such

categorization alone invalidates a clickwrap agreement.
B. Validating Standardized Contracts: The Requirement of a “Reasonable Expectation” of
Negotiation
The Supreme Court made it clear in Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute that the
enforceability of a contract is not necessarily tied to negotiated terms.140 In Carnival, the Court
addressed the enforceability of a standardized form contract set forth on a cruise line ticket.141 A
purchaser of such ticket argued that the terms on the cruise line ticket should not be enforced
because the terms were not the product of an open negotiation. The Court held, however, that it
must be reasonable to expect negotiation, and it would be entirely unreasonable to presume
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negotiations should occur on contracts that are purely routine and nearly identical to every other
contract a seller has issued.142 The Court continued by asserting “common sense dictates that a
ticket of this kind will be a form contract, the terms of which are not subject to negotiation, and that
an individual purchasing the ticket will not have bargaining power with [the seller].”143 The
significance of Carnival to clickwrap agreements should not be understated. ProCD, Inc. and
numerous other clickwrap cases have cited Carnival when addressing the enforceability of the
standardized contract format inherent to clickwrap.144 In Carnival, as well as the clickwrap and
shrinkwrap cases that followed, the courts stressed the pragmatism and possible functional benefits
that non-negotiated standardized contracts could offer.145
C. The Practical Benefit of Standardized Contracts
In ProCD, Inc., the court emphasized that standardized contracts are essential to a system of
mass production and distribution and are valuable to buyers and sellers alike.146 One cannot,
according to the court, expect a seller to place its entire agreement on the outside of its
merchandise.147 By placing notice of terms on the outside, and providing the buyer an opportunity
to review and reject such terms, the court maintained that scarce resources can then be devoted to an
entire class of transactions rather than expended in negotiating the details of a single contract.148
“Adjusting terms in a buyer’s favor,” the court asserted, “might help [that particular buyer], but it
would lead to a response, such as higher prices, that might make consumers as a whole worse
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off.”149 In Hill, the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reiterated its holding in ProCD, Inc.
by stating that “practical considerations support allowing vendors to enclose the full legal terms
with their products."150 The Seventh Circuit’s line of thought was consistent with the reasoning in
Carnival that buyers purchasing standardized contracts may benefit from reduced pricing resulting
from minimized negotiation costs.151
D. Judicial Scrutiny and the Protection of Competition from Holdings of Unconscionable Terms
Although courts have rejected the notion that the enforceability of a contract is tied to open
bargaining, courts have also been clear that standardized contracts are subject to judicial scrutiny for
fundamental fairness.152

Generally, contracts that are the result of open negotiations and are

unaffected by fraud or undue influence are given full effect by the courts.153 Nevertheless, courts
have placed heightened scrutiny on the terms of standardized form contracts that are offered on a
take-it-or-leave-it basis by a party of unequally strong bargaining power.154 Courts have also held,
however, that the availability of alternative sources may defeat the argument that a contract is
unenforceable on the basis of adhesion.155 As the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit stated,
“competition among vendors, not judicial revision of a [contract’s packaging], is how consumers
are protected in a market economy.”156 A New York appellate court reiterated the Seventh Circuit’s
holding and maintained that given “the ability to make the purchase elsewhere and the express
option to return the goods, the consumer is not in a ‘take it or leave it’ position at all.”157
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If competition assures enforceability, one might assume that a lack of competition would
invalidate a contract of adhesion such as clickwrap. To hold an adhesion contract unenforceable,
however, the most critical factors to be considered are associated with the doctrine of
unconscionability.158
E. Establishing Unconscionable Terms in the Absence of Competition
1. The Requirement to Prove both Procedural and Substantive Unconscionability
A lack of competition will invalidate a contract only if the contract was both procedurally
and substantively unconscionable when made.159

A lack of competition with no negotiation

possibilities, in a typical contract of adhesion such as clickwrap, will meet the criteria for procedural
unconscionability.160 Moreover, a claim of procedural unconscionability cannot be defeated by just
any showing of possible competition.161 There must be reasonable competition and an ability to
secure substantially similar products and/or services as those in question.162
Even if an agreement is procedurally unconscionable, it may nonetheless be enforceable if
the substantive terms are reasonable.163 A determination of substantive unconscionability requires
proof of overly harsh or one-sided terms that “shock the conscience”.164 In upholding the validity
of a forum clause in a clickwrap agreement, for instance, a Texas appellate court held that even in
cases of monopolies, “it is the unfair use of, not the mere presence of, unequal bargaining power
that can undermine a contract.”165 Accordingly, invalidating clickwrap on the basis of substantive
unconscionability requires evidence that an unfair use of superior bargaining power resulted in
158
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contractual conditions so exceedingly calloused as to be unreasonably burdensome to the agreeing
party.166
Several courts have held clickwrap terms to be unenforceable on the basis of the
unconscionability doctrine.167 Nevertheless, such cases serve only to reinforce the validity of
clickwrap, as it was the terms of the contract, not the clickwrap (or shrinkwrap) agreement itself,
that were held to be unenforceable.168
2. Decisions Finding Clickwrap Unconscionable: Demonstrating Substantive Unconscionability
In Brower v. Gateway 2000, Inc., for instance, the court concluded that Gateway 2000’s
arbitration clause was unconscionable on the basis of an unreasonable cost to the plaintiff.169
Gateway 2000’s agreement required that all disputes relating to the agreement be settled by
arbitration conducted in Chicago, Illinois, by an official arbitrator of the International Chamber of
Commerce (“ICC”). The ICC’s headquarters, however, was located in France, and contact with the
ICC could be made only through the United States Council for International Business.
Additionally, the ICC required an advance fee of $4,000 (more than the product in question), of
which $2,000 was non-refundable. The consumer was also required to pay all Gateway 2000’s
legal fees should Gateway 2000 prevail at the arbitration. The court held that the excessive cost
factor necessitated by such arbitration provision was unreasonable and served to deter consumers
from seeking the appropriate dispute resolution process.170
While the court in Brower held a clickwrap provision to be unenforceable, the court in
Comb v. PayPal, Inc. held that PayPal’s clickwrap agreement itself was so one-sided that it was
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substantively unconscionable.171

Paypal’s clickwrap agreement authorized PayPal to freeze

customer accounts and retain funds that it alone determined were subject to dispute. Additionally,
PayPal utilized such a practice without notice to its customers. As the court noted, PayPal’s
customers were allowed to resolve disputes only after PayPal had control over their disputed funds
for an indefinite period.172 The clickwrap agreement also allowed PayPal to modify or amend the
agreement without notification and required customers to be bound by any such modification.
Moreover, PayPal’s arbitration clause prohibited customers from consolidating their claims and, for
many of the same reasons cited in Brower, was also found to be unreasonably cost-prohibitive.173
The court found that PayPal had shown no “business realities to justify such one-sidedness.”174
Consequently, the court concluded that, under the totality of the circumstances, PayPal’s clickwrap
agreement was substantively unconscionable and unenforceable.175
In neither Brower nor Comb, however, did the courts rule that the related agreements were
unenforceable because of their format.176 On the contrary, both courts held that clickwrap or
shrinkwrap agreements were generally enforceable as contractual documents.177 In fact, when
referencing the enforceability of clickwrap and shrinkwrap agreements, the Brower court
specifically cited both Hill and ProCD, Inc., and asserted that the commonality of such agreements
now enables “the consumer to make purchases of sophisticated merchandise . . . over the phone or
by mail - and even by computer.”178
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G. The Lesson in Applying the Unconscionable Doctrine: Clickwrap Plays by the Same Rules as
any Other Contract
Whether it is an agreement executed on paper, established on the Internet, or by other
electronic means, the doctrine of adhesion is applied no differently.179 Invalidating a clickwrap
agreement, as with any other contract, requires not only a showing of procedural unconscionability
(which clickwrap meets), but also a showing of substantive unconscionability.180 Findings of
unenforceability, however, have been limited, and courts have noted that the theory of
unconscionability is not intended as a vortex for elements of fairness embodied by other existing
law.181 Provided, therefore, that the terms of a clickwrap agreement are reasonable, then the
conspicuous notice of terms and the ability to review and reject such terms will establish the
enforceability of clickwrap.182

As the Seventh Circuit has stated, clickwrap agreements “are

enforceable unless their terms are objectionable on grounds applicable to contracts in general.”183
Nonetheless, the concept of negotiation raises a final significant question with regard to
clickwrap agreements, specifically as the concept relates to CD clickwrap. Because the terms of
CD clickwrap typically arise subsequent to the parties’ initial transaction, it is entirely possible that
a negotiated written agreement may exist prior to the appearance of such clickwrap terms. If such
agreement exists, it would seem (at least on the surface) that the terms of any subsequent clickwrap
agreement would be considered merely an attempt to incorporate additional terms, and such terms
would be of no effect without the party’s explicit assent. Considering the fact-based analysis of
clickwrap case law, however, such circumstances require further exploration.
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V. PRIOR WRITTEN AGREEMENTS: DOES THEIR EXISTENCE AUTOMATICALLY
INVALIDATE A SUBSEQUENT CLICKWRAP CONTRACT?
A. General Rules and the UCC: Determining Final Intent of the Parties is a Question of Fact
If an executed agreement already exists, section 2-209 of the UCC requires an express
acceptance of any proposed supplemental contract terms, and such express assent cannot be inferred
merely from a party’s conduct.184 Between merchants, however, when specific terms are not
expressed until after the contract is formed, UCC § 2-207 governs the interpretation of the contract,
and such terms, to the extent they materially alter the parties' agreement, are not incorporated into
the parties' final agreement.185 Determining which written document the parties actually intended to
represent as their final integrated agreement is determined on a case-by-case basis.186
Consequently, whether the parties intended a particular written document to be the final expression
of their contract terms is a question of fact and, in determining such question, the courts may
analyze the various circumstances surrounding the formation of such contract.187
B. The Importance of Explicit Terms in Invalidating Subsequent Clickwrap Agreements
The query is whether clickwrap constitutes additional supplemental terms to a prior written
agreement that must be expressly accepted by the parties; or whether, conversely, clickwrap terms
can serve to fill the gaps in an existing contract, thereby allowing such terms to be incorporated into
an existing agreement. Two cases help answer these questions.
1. Trumping Clickwrap with Unambiguous Agreements and Integration Clauses
In Morgan Laboratories, Inc. v Micro Data Base Systems, Inc., the parties entered into an
agreement in 1991 that contained an integration clause explicitly precluding any modifications to the
184
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contract without the written consent of the parties.188 The defendant, Micro Data Base Systems, Inc.,
claimed that the terms of its shrinkwrap license constituted necessary supplemental terms to the 1991
agreement because such agreement did not contain certain specific provisions found in the
shrinkwrap (i.e. a forum clause). Additionally, the defendant asserted that Morgan Laboratories
accepted the additional shrinkwrap terms through its course of conduct. The court held, however,
that a course of conduct does not replace a no-modification-unless-in-writing provision.189 Assent
must be express and cannot be inferred merely from conduct.190 The court maintained that although
shrinkwrap may be enforceable, it cannot trump explicit prior agreements when those agreements
contain a valid integration clause.191
2. Upholding Clickwrap: Filling the Void left by Ambiguous Terms and a Prior Course of Conduct
The case in M.A. Mortenson Co., Inc. v. Timberline Software Corp., however, demonstrated
that a prior course of conduct can indeed prove relevant when an existing agreement is void of
critical terms, specifically an integration clause.192

In Mortenson Co., Inc., the plaintiff

(“Mortenson”) issued a purchase order to Timberline Software Corp. (“Timberline”) for an upgrade
of its existing software system. Mortenson was a construction contractor that utilized Timberline’s
bid analysis software when responding to construction bids. Mortenson had utilized Timberline’s
software for three years prior to initiating its purchase order to Timberline for an upgraded system.
Mortenson subsequently brought suit against Timberline for breach of warranties and alleged that
the upgraded software was defective. Timberline moved for summary judgment, arguing that the
limitation for damages set forth in its clickwrap agreement barred Mortenson’s recovery.
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Mortenson countered that the purchase order consisted of the entire contract between the parties,
and that it therefore never affirmatively agreed to Timberline’s clickwrap agreement.
The court held that the purchase order was not an integrated contract and that the terms of
the clickwrap agreement were enforceable against Mortenson.193 In reaching its conclusion, the
court specifically pointed to the prior “course of dealing” between the parties.194 The court noted,
for instance, that Mortenson had to explicitly assent to the software license by clicking “I agree”
prior to accessing the software services and had completed such transactions on numerous occasions
over the three years it had utilized Timberline’s software.195 Just as important, however, was the
court’s determination that Mortenson’s purchase order failed as an integrated contract based on its
absence of an integration clause and lack of certain explicit terms.196 The court pointed out that the
purchase order set an hourly rate for software support but it failed to specify how many hours of
support were included.197 Similarly, the purchase order established that the software would be
updated, but the pricing for such upgrades was to be determined at a later point in time.198
Moreover, the court asserted that the presence of an integration clause in a contract provides strong
support to an argument that the parties intended such contract to be fully integrated.199
Accordingly, the court found that because no such clause was contained in Mortenson’s purchase
order, and because the contract was lacking in certain critical terms, the logical conclusion was that
the contract was not intended as the complete and final agreement between the parties.200 The court
determined, therefore, that the existence of the prior purchase order did not invalidate the
subsequent clickwrap terms. In fact, the terms of Timberline’s clickwrap agreement, according to
193
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the court, served to fill the gaps present in Mortenson’s purchase order.201 Consequently, the court
held that when Mortenson clicked “I agree” and began utilizing the software, Mortenson explicitly
assented to the terms of Timberline’s clickwrap agreement.202
C. Notes of Caution while Reinforcing the Validity of Clickwrap
Considering the holdings in Mortenson Co., Inc.203 and Morgan Laboratories, Inc.,204 a
word of warning is appropriate. When the possibility for a subsequent clickwrap contract is present,
counsel, contract officers, and purchasing officials must all be aware of the impact their contract
formation, and specifically their contract provisions, may have on the enforceability of the
clickwrap agreement.

In fact, it seems advisable in such circumstances to specifically reject a

party’s clickwrap agreement within the integration clause of a contract.
Nonetheless, the holdings above reinforce the validity of clickwrap as a method of
contracting. If the enforceability of clickwrap terms can even be questioned, much less upheld,
when a prior agreement exists, then it stands to reason that clickwrap can certainly be deemed
enforceable under normal contractual circumstances.
VII. CONCLUSION
A preliminary review of clickwrap court decisions could lead one to assume that a great deal
of uncertainty and discrepancy exits in this area of the law. Upon further analysis, however, it
becomes clear that such discrepancies are based more on interpretation of facts than differences in
legal reasoning. Although the final judgments of the various courts may seem disparate, the courts
201
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have applied basic contract law in determining the enforceability of clickwrap agreements, and their
legal reasoning has been consistent.205
Basic contract law doctrines require a manifestation of agreement between the parties.206
Such manifestation of assent cannot occur unless there exists a prior ability to review and reject the
terms of the agreement.207 Additionally, a party must be given reasonable notice of such terms prior
to securing the related products or services.208 In all the clickwrap cases reviewed above, the courts
consistently applied these standard principles of contract law. As the Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit pointed out, “reasonably conspicuous notice of the existence of contract terms and
unambiguous assent to those terms” are essential to maintain the integrity of electronic
transactions.209
Similarly, courts have applied basic contract law in approaching questions of “adhesion”
inherent in clickwrap agreements. To hold a contract of adhesion unenforceable, it must be shown
that the contract was both procedurally and substantively unconscionable.210 Again, courts have
been consistent in their application of this doctrine when reviewing clickwrap disputes. Although a
clickwrap agreement (in the absence of reasonable competition) may meet the criteria of procedural
unconscionability, a showing of substantive unconscionability is still required to find the agreement
unenforceable.211 As a result, courts have found clickwrap agreements unenforceable on this basis
in only a limited number of circumstances.212
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Unless a clickwrap agreement is specifically precluded by the existence of a previous
contract, the clickwrap agreement will be upheld if its terms are not found unconscionable and the
agreement is otherwise compliant with standard contractual requirements. As the Court of Appeals
for the Seventh Circuit explicitly phrased it, a clickwrap agreement will be held “enforceable unless
[its] terms are objectionable on grounds applicable to contracts in general.”213 In other words,
counsel, purchasers, and contract officers should be aware that objections to clickwrap are no
different than objections to any other forms of contracting. In establishing this principle, the courts
have been clear and their legal reasoning consistent.
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